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Abstract 
This paper seeks to explain inter-state variation in non-compliance with European law. While 
non-compliance has not significantly increased over time, some member states violate European 
law more frequently than others. In order to account for the variance observed, we draw on three 
prominent approaches in the compliance literature – enforcement, management, and legitimacy. 
In the first place, we develop a set of hypotheses for each of the three theories. We then discuss 
how they can be combined in theoretically consistent ways and develop three integrated models. 
Finally, we empirically test these models drawing on a unique and comprehensive dataset, which 
comprises more than 6,300 instances of member-state non-compliance with European law be-
tween 1978 and 1999. The empirical findings show that the combined model of the enforcement 
and the management approach turns out to have the highest explanatory power. Politically pow-
erful member states are most likely to violate European law while the best compliers are small 
countries with highly efficient bureaucracies. Yet, administrative capacity also matters for pow-
erful member states. The UK and Germany are much more compliant than France and Italy, 
which command similar political power but whose administrations are ridden by bureaucratic 
inefficiency and corruption. 
                                                           
*The paper summarizes some major findings of a collaborative research project funded by the 
German Research Council from 2004 till 2007 (BÖ 1831/1-2). 
  
1.  Introduction1 
 
One of the major questions in the research on international institutions has been “why 
governments, seeking to promote their own interests, ever comply with the rules of interna-
tional regimes when they view these rules as in conflict with [...] their myopic self-interest.”2 
While realists argue that states simply do not comply if the costs of a rule are too high,  rational 
institutionalists point to the role of international regimes and organizations, which entail moni-
toring, sanctioning, and adjudication mechanisms increasing the costs of non-compliance. Man-
agement theories, by contrast, focus on capacity building and rule specification. Social construc-
tivists, finally, stress legitimacy, socialization, and norm internalization through processes of so-
cial learning and persuasion. Thus, different International Relations approaches provide differ-
ent explanations for why states comply. They have paid less attention to the question of why 
some states comply better than others.  
 
This paper seeks to find out why some states are more inclined to comply with interna-
tional norms and rules than others. The European Union (EU) is an ideal case to explore this 
question. As “masters of the treaties,” the member states still have a significant say on the norms 
and rules they have to comply with. At the same time, EU institutions entail highly legalized 
monitoring, adjudication, and sanctioning mechanisms. They do not only aim at changing the 
instrumental calculations of states by increasing the costs of non-compliance, but also allow for 
rule specification and capacity building, and promote processes of social learning and persua-
sion. Thus, all approaches should expect a rather high level of compliance. Many students of 
European Politics would agree that the EU, compared to many international regimes, does not 
suffer from serious compliance problems.3  Yet, the member states vary significantly in their 
compliance with European law. Why is it, for example, that EU-skeptic Great Britain, Sweden 
and Denmark belong to the compliance leaders while more EU-friendly Italy, France, or Portu-
gal join the group of the laggards? Or, why do centralized countries like France and Greece have 
equally as bad compliance records as federal Belgium and regionalized Italy?  
 
In order to explain the varying degree of state compliance with European law, this paper 
draws on a unique and comprehensive data set. For the very first time, researchers have been 
granted direct access to the infringement data base of the European Commission, which is in 
charge of monitoring compliance with European law. The Commission provided us with a com-
plete set of all the cases it opened against the member states for violating European law between 
1978 and 1999. Unlike the data published in the Commission’s Official Reports, our data base 
contains information regarding the nature of non-compliance, the type of law infringed on, the 
policy sector to which the law pertains, the violating member state, and the measures taken by 
EU institutions in response to non-compliance for each of the more than 6,300 infringement 
                                                 
1We thank Andrea Liese, Katarina Linos, Thomas Risse, Beth Simmons, Paul Schure, Cornelia Ulbert, 
Karen Alter, Robert Falkner, the participants of the Harvard Weatherhead Center for International Affairs 
seminar on International Law and International Relations, and the participants of the Princeton Center for 
Globalization and Governance work shop for detailed comments. Needless to say, we are solely respon-
sible for any conceptual, methodological, or empirical errors that may remain. 
2Keohane 1984: 99. 
3Zürn and Joerges 2005.   1 
cases.4 The data confirm that there is significant variance in the level of compliance among the 
member states that backs explanation. 
 
In a nutshell, we argue that member-state compliance is a function of both power and ca-
pacity. Politically powerful member states are most likely to violate European law while the best 
compliers are small countries with highly efficient bureaucracies. Yet, administrative capacity 
also matters for powerful member states. The UK and Germany are much more compliant than 
France and Italy, which wield similar political power but whose administrations are ridden with 
bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption. In fact, we find an interaction between capacity and 
power, where capacity conditions the relation between power and compliance. With increasing 
bureaucratic efficiency, the non-compliance promoting effects of power are gradually reduced. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. After outlining our empirical puzzle, we review three 
prominent compliance approaches in the International Relations literature. Enforcement ap-
proaches assume that states violate international norms and rules voluntarily because they are 
not willing to bear the costs of compliance. International institutions increasing external con-
straints can alter strategic cost-benefit calculations of states and lead to a change of their prefer-
ences over strategies eventually resulting in compliance. By contrast, management approaches 
argue that non-compliance is involuntary, i.e., is not the result of strategic choices. States are 
willing to comply but lack the necessary resources. The third approach – legitimacy – argues 
similarly to enforcement theories that non-compliance is strategic. But, unlike management and 
enforcement approaches, legitimacy draws on socialization, persuasion, and learning mecha-
nisms. Compliance is not a matter of sufficient material resources or a question of costs and 
benefits of rule confirming behavior, but depends on whether a rule is internalized and accepted 
as a standard for appropriate behavior.  
 
For each of the three approaches, we develop a set of hypotheses. While the literature of-
ten treats them as competing or at least alternative explanations, there are good reasons, both 
theoretical and empirical, to combine them.5 We discuss three options for integrating the power, 
capacity and legitimacy in a theoretically consistent and meaningful way and derive an addi-
tional set of hypotheses for our integrated models.  
 
Next, we test our different models using quantitative methods. The empirical findings 
show that the combined model of the enforcement and the management approach has the high-
est explanatory power. The best compliers are member states that have ample administrative ca-
pacity and lack the power to resist compliance. Conversely, the countries with the worst compli-
ance records are those with limited capacity but enough power to resist the Commission’s en-
forcement efforts. Member states with weak capacity and limited power are not very good com-
pliers either but they still fare better than their powerful counterparts. Finally, powerful member 
states with strong capacity comply better than powerful member states with weak capacity. In 
short, while power has a negative impact on compliance it is reduced by the interaction with 
capacity. 
 
In the concluding section, we place the EU in a comparative perspective and discuss the 
extent to which our findings can be applied to international regimes and organization, which 
                                                 
4The data are available by the authors upon request. Once the article is published, the database will be 
made publicly accessible at http://www.fu-berlin.de/europa. 
5Checkel 2001; Tallberg 2002.   2 
possess a lower degree of institutionalization and legalization. Our research shows that even 
highly legalized international institutions do not completely mitigate power differences between 
states. Moreover, while capacity-building by international institutions is an effective way to im-
prove compliance, it should combine resource transfer with measures for fostering bureaucratic 
efficiency. 
 
2.   Non-Compliance in the European Union   
 
2.1.  Infringement Proceedings as a Measure of Non-compliance 
 
Studies on compliance with international norms and rules face a serious methodological 
challenge of measuring their dependent variable.6 Many have developed their own assessment 
criteria and collected the empirical information in laborious case studies.7 Others have drawn on 
statistical data provided by the monitoring bodies of international regimes and organizations, 
like the European Commission has done for the EU since 1984.8 Its Annual Reports on Monitor-
ing the Application of Community Law9 contain information on the legal action the Commission 
brought against the member states since 1978. Article 226 ECT (ex-Article 169) entitles the Com-
mission to open infringement proceedings against member states suspected in violation of Euro-
pean law. These infringement proceedings consists of several stages. The first two suspected in-
fringements (complaints, petitions, etc.) and Formal Letters, are considered informal and treated 
largely as confidential. The official infringement procedure (Article 226 ECT) starts when the 
European Commission issues a Reasoned Opinion and ends with a ruling of the European Court 
of Justice. If the member states still refuse to comply, the Commission can open new proceed-
ings (Article 228 ECT, ex-Article 171), which may result in financial penalties. Article 228 ECT pro-
ceedings consist of the same stages as Article 226 ECT proceedings but the ECJ has the possibility 
to impose a financial penalty.10 
 
The dependent variable of our study uses the Reasoned Opinions as a measurement for 
non-compliance for two reasons. First, for the previous two stages, the Commission only pro-
vides aggregate data on the total number of cases brought against individual member states – 
information on individual cases is considered confidential. Second, Reasoned Opinions concern 
the more serious cases of non-compliance since they refer to issues that could not be solved 
through informal negotiations at the previous, unofficial stages. Note that two-thirds of all the 
cases in which the Commission had issued a Formal Letter between 1978 and 1999 got settled 
before a Reasoned Opinion had to be sent.  
 
In order to control for the growing number of legal acts that can be potentially infringed 
on, we use the relative number of Reasoned Opinions sent per legal act rather than the absolute 
number per member state in a given year. Between 1978 and 1999, the Commission opened al-
most 17,000 infringement proceedings (Formal Letters). Over the same time, the number of legal 
acts in force has more than doubled from less than 5,000 to almost 10,000. By taking the number 
of Reasoned Opinions sent to a member states in a given year as percentage of the legal act in 
                                                 
6Simmons 1998; Raustiala and Slaughter 2002. 
7Duina 1997; Mitchell 2003; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998. 
8For instance Reinhardt 2001, Steinberg 2002. 
9Source: http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/eulaw/index_en.htm, last accessed on February 15, 2007. 
10Snyder 1993; Tallberg 2002.   3 
force at the time of violation in addition to using time dummies in our analyses, we avoid prob-
lems of time trends (ever-growing number of legal acts) and structural breaks caused by politi-
cal events, such as the completion of the Internal Market, which frequently haunt panel and time 
series analyzes.11  
 
The database, on which this paper draws, is based on a unique and comprehensive data-
set including all the infringement proceedings in which the European Commission sent a Rea-
soned Opinion to the member states between 1978 and 1999.12 It contains more than 6,300 indi-
vidual infringement cases, which are classified by infringement number, member state, policy 
sector, legal basis (CELEX number), legal act, type of infringement, and stage reached in the pro-
ceedings. The Commission gave us access to its own data base. We were allowed to download 
all the data available for the years 1978 till 1999 (excluding the Formal Letters). This is the very 
first time that researchers have received such data. 
 
Using infringements as a measurement for non-compliance with European law is not 
without problems. There are good reasons to question whether infringement proceedings qual-
ify as valid and reliable indicators of compliance failure, that is, whether they constitute a ran-
dom sample of all the non-compliance cases that occur. First, for reasons of limited resources, 
the Commission is not capable of detecting and legally pursuing all instances of non-compliance 
with European law. Infringement proceedings present only a fraction of all instances of non-
compliance, and we have no means of estimating their real number. Moreover, the infringement 
sample could be seriously biased since the Commission depends heavily on member-statees’ re-
porting back on their implementation activities, on costly and time-consuming consultancy re-
ports, and on information from citizens, interest groups and companies. But whereas the moni-
toring capacity of member states and their domestic actors varies, there is no indication that the 
limited detection of non-compliance systematically biases infringement data towards certain 
member states. We have been conducting an expert survey, which asks 189 policymakers, civil 
servants, companies, interest groups and scientific experts in the EU member states which form 
part of our study, to assess the level of non-compliance in their country in general and with re-
spect to core norms and rules in different policy areas. The response rate was more than 60 per-
cent and the results correspond with the relative distribution of infringement proceedings, 
which strengthens our confidence that the data do not contain a systematic bias.  
 
2.2  Mapping Member-state Non-compliance with European Law 
 
Our data on non-compliance with European law show significant variation among the 
member states (Graph 1).13 Member states can be divided into three groups: leaders, laggards 
and the middle-field. The three Scandinavian member states, the United Kingdom, and the 
Netherlands are good compliers and rarely violate European law. By contrast, the Southern 
European countries (including France) – with the exception of Spain – and Belgium seriously lag 
behind. The rest of the member states range in between, forming the middle-field. Analyzing 
                                                 
11Cf. Banerjee et al. 1993; Enders 2004. 
121978 is the first year, for which the Commission comprehensively published infringement data. 1999 is 
the last year, for which the Commission was willing to give us access to its data base. 
13Our analysis only covers the EU 12, since our dataset ends in 1999. Including the three member states 
that joined the EU in 1995 might have introduced a bias in our data, since the average number of infringe-
ments tends to increase in the years after accession.   4 
this pattern more closely, we also find that it is virtually constant over time. Leaders stay leaders, 
while Italy, France and Greece always belong to the group of member states with the worst com-
pliance record. Graph 1 does not only present the ranking of the member states from exemplary 
Denmark on the left to notorious Italy on the right by their average non-compliance records. The 
box plots also show, for example, that Italy receives a median of one Reasoned Opinion from the 
Commission per 100 legal acts in force each year, whereas Denmark, as well as the other Scan-
dinavian countries not depicted in the graph, infringe on only one out of 1,000 legal acts on the 
median.  
 
Graph 1: Annual Reasoned Opinions per Legal Act (in %) by EU 12 Member States, 1986-99 
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The distribution of non-compliance among member states is puzzling because, at first 
sight, none of the prominent compliance approaches seems to provide an explanation that sys-
tematically accounts for the variance observed. Realists should ask themselves why France and 
Italy wield similar economic and political power in the EU as Germany and the UK do, but are 
much less compliant. This becomes even more puzzling for management theories since France 
and Italy comply as badly as or even worse than Greece and Portugal, which are the two poorest 
countries in the EU 15. Constructivists should have a hard time in understanding why EU skep-
tical countries like the UK, Denmark, Sweden or Finland comply much better with European 
law than states that are highly supportive of European integration, such as France, Italy or Bel-
gium. Institutionalists have in general difficulties in accounting for country variation since the 
level of legalization is the same for states within an international institution. Likewise, monitor-
ing and sanctioning mechanisms should affect the cost-benefit calculations of states in an equal 
way. Variance is much more expected between international institutions, if they differ in their 
degree of obligation, delegation and precision.14 Of course, the costs of (non-)compliance may 
                                                 
14Abbott et al. 2000; Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter 2000.   5 
vary across countries. But then we need an explanation for why some states face higher costs 
than others, something which institutionalist theories usually do not provide. As we will see be-
low, combining institutionalist reasoning with a power-based enforcement approach is one way 
to solve this problem. 
 
3.   Three Compliance Approaches 
 
To explain why there is significant variation between member states with regard to their 
level of (non-)compliance with European law, we have to find country-based explanations. In-
ternational Relations theories, such as the enforcement, management and legitimacy approaches, 
primarily focus on institutional design (monitoring and sanctioning, capacity-building and adju-
dication and socialization). Consequently, they have largely been used to account for variation 
in compliance across international institutions. However, all three approaches can be easily re-
formulated to account for country-specific explanatory factors, such as the power (enforcement), 
the capacity (management) of states and the acceptance of international rules and institutions 
(legitimacy) by states. 
 
3.1.   Enforcement  
 
Enforcement approaches assume that states choose to violate international norms and 
rules because they are not willing to bear the costs of compliance. Incentives for defection are 
particularly strong if international norms and rules are not compatible with national arrange-
ments, as a result of which compliance requires substantial changes at the domestic level.15 From 
this rationalist perspective, non-compliance can only be prevented by increasing the costs of 
non-compliance.16  Increasing external constraints by establishing institutionalized monitoring 
and sanctioning mechanisms can alter strategic cost-benefit calculations of states. The likelihood 
of being detected and punished increases the anticipated costs of non-compliance, be they mate-
rial (economic sanctions or financial penalties)17 or immaterial (loss of reputation and credibili-
ty).18 Such costs may finally lead to a change of strategic preferences towards compliance. How-
ever, states do not necessarily face the same compliance costs nor are they equally sensitive to 
sanctions.19  Drawing on power-based theories of International Relations, we can distinguish 
three strands of the enforcement approach. 
 
The Power of Recalcitrance: Power Matters at the Stage of Enforcement 
 
Following the argument of Keohane and Nye on power and interdependence,20 states 
can be regarded as being more sensitive to the costs imposed by sanctions if they have less po-
litical or economic power than other states, the latter being more resistant to external pressures. 
With regard to our dependent variable, we would then expect that the less powerful EU mem-
ber states are, the more sensitive they are to external enforcement constraints and the less likely 
they are to infringe EU legal acts, hence, the smaller their number of infringements compared to 
                                                 
15Cf. Cortell and Davis 1996; Checkel 2001; Risse and Ropp 1999; Underdal 1998. 
16Martin 1992; Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996; Downs 1998; Dorn and Fulton 1997. 
17Martin 1992; Fearon 1998. 
18Checkel calls this “social sanctioning” (Checkel 2001: 558; cf. Klotz 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Guro-
witz 1999; Satori 2002; Schoppa 1999. 
19Abbott et al. 2000; Garrett, Kelemen, and Schulz 1998; Horne and Cutlip 2002. 
20Keohane 1988.   6 
less cost-sensitive, i.e., more powerful, member states. Hence, the political and economic weight 
of a state allows it to be recalcitrant with respect to the effective implementation of European law. 
This variant of the enforcement approach emphasizes the extent to which power translates into 
indifference or resistance vis-à-vis external constraints imposed on states.21 The mechanism of 
recalcitrance thereby predicts a positive relationship between the power of a state and its non-
compliance record. The first enforcement hypothesis (H1a) expects that more powerful states in-
fringe on international and European laws more often than weaker states.  
 
The Power of Assertiveness: Power Matters at the Stage of Decision Making 
 
Another variant of the enforcement approach focuses on states, but attributes more 
weight to the decision-making process. According to this line of argumentation, the power of a 
member state does not only deploy an impact in the implementation stage (resulting in recalci-
trance), but also in the stage of decision making. Moreover, high power results in a better record 
of compliance. The political and economic weight of a member state is closely related to its asser-
tiveness, i.e., its ability to shape legal acts according to its preferences.22 The extent to which a 
state has managed to impose its preferences during negotiating procedures determines the costs 
of compliance and thereby the state’s willingness to comply with the decision ex post. Hence, if 
power is defined as assertiveness in the decision-making process, a second enforcement hypo-
thesis (H1b) expects that more powerful states infringe on international and European laws less often 
than weaker states.  
 
The Power of Deterrence: Power Matters for the Enforcement Authority 
 
The assumption of a positive impact of state power on compliance has been taken up by 
other strands of the enforcement literature which emphasize, however, another causal mecha-
nism. According to this line of argumentation, the political and economic weight of a state can 
translate into a deterrence of the enforcement authority, i.e., the institution which monitors compli-
ance and imposes sanctions against free-riders and norm-violators.23 Like the hypothesis about 
the recalcitrance of powerful states, the deterrence hypothesis stresses the relationship between the 
non-compliant state and the enforcement authority. But rather than conceptualizing the power 
of the non-compliant state as determining its reaction to actions of the enforcement authority, it 
explains the behavior of the enforcement authority in the first place. It assumes a principal-agent 
relation between the states (principals) and the enforcement authority (agent), in which the latter 
ultimately depends on the former since the states can always renounce the power of the enforce-
ment authority.24 This asymmetrical relationship may induce the enforcement authority to act 
strategically and be reluctant to impose sanctions on powerful states. This asymmetry is strong-
er for powerful member states since they have more political weight in international institutions, 
which they could use to punish the enforcement authority. Regarding the case of the European 
Union, the European Commission or the European Court of Justice (ECJ) might therefore be less 
willing either to open infringement proceedings or to issue rulings against powerful member 
states, since they finally depend on the extent to which member states are willing to delegate 
this authority to them. Thus, similarly to the assertiveness hypothesis, the deterrence hypothesis 
predicts a lower record of non-compliance cases for powerful states. In contrast to the assertive-
                                                 
21Martin 1992. 
22Giuliani 2003; Moravcsik 1997; Fearon 1998; Keohane and Nye 1977. 
23Abbott et al. 2000; Garrett, Kelemen, and Schulz 1998; Horne and Cutlip 2002. 
24Horne and Cutlip 2002: 301; cf. Garrett, 1998 #4238}; Tallberg 2000.   7 
ness hypothesis, however, powerful member states might actually violate a rule, but are simply 
not being sanctioned for it. In this perspective, the deterrence hypothesis only allows for making 
predictions about the probability with which violations are prosecuted and sanctioned, not about the 
actual occurrence and prevalence of non-compliance.25 The third enforcement hypothesis (H1c) 
expects that the more powerful a state is, the less probably it will face infringement proceedings since en-
forcement authorities are deterred. 
 
Table 1: Overview of the Enforcement Hypotheses 
 
Power of recalcitrance (H1a)  Power of assertiveness (H1b)  Power of deterrence (H1c) 
Powerful states infringe on 
European law more often than 
weak states (since they are less 
sensitive to the costs imposed 
by sanctions). 
Powerful states infringe on 
European law less often than 
weak states (since they have 
been able to decrease the costs 
of compliance by shaping 
European law according to 
their preferences). 
Powerful states are less likely 
to be prosecuted and sanc-
tioned for infringements 
against European law (since 
enforcement authorities are 
deterred by them). 
 
Operationalization of the Independent Variables 
 
In order to test for the influence of the power of recalcitrance on non-compliance, we in-
corporate two power indicators into our analyses. These indicators are widely used in the litera-
ture and account for different aspects of power – economic size and EU-specific political power. 
Gross domestic product (“GDP”) is a proxy for economic power.26 It influences the sensitivity to-
wards material costs of financial penalties or the withholding of EU subsidies. The data come 
from the World Development Indicators.27 Direct EU-specific political power is more relevant 
for reputational costs. Member states such as Germany and France, which have significant vot-
ing power, cannot be ignored by others in EU decision making, even if they may have lost credi-
bility by not abiding with previously agreed-upon rules. Thus, we use the proportion of times 
when a member state is pivotal (and can, thus, turn a losing into a winning coalition) under QMV 
(qualified majority voting) in the Council of Ministers (“SSI”) as an indicator of EU-specific po-
litical power.28 This indicator also serves for the operationalization of the assertiveness and de-
terrence hypotheses. The power to shape EU rules and to deter the Commission, respectively, is 
strongly mitigated by the highly institutionalized context of EU decision making and the need 
for coalition building, as a result of which power resources, such as military capabilities, do not 
carry much weight. Population is relevant but captured by “SSI” since the number of votes a 
member state has is based on the size of its population. 
 
 
                                                 
25Cf. Reiss 1984. A proper test of the deterrence hypotheses would require an approach which looks at the 
later stages of the infringement proceedings when the material costs of imposed sanctions become more 
imminent. We have done this in a separate study, which confirms our findings for the Reasoned Opinion 
stage (Authors). 
26Keohane 1989; Martin 1992; Moravcsik 1998; Steinberg 2002. 
27World Bank 2005. 
28Shapley and Shubik 1954; Rodden 2002.   8 
3.2.   Management 
 
The management school assumes that non-compliance is involuntary. Even if states 
would like to comply with a European rule, they are prevented from doing so if the very precon-
ditions that enable state compliance are absent. There are three sources of involuntary non-
compliance: lacking or insufficient state capacities, ambiguous definitions of norms and inade-
quate timetables up to which compliance has to be achieved.29 While management approaches 
attribute equal influence to capacities, precision of norms and transposition timetables, the latter 
two factors relate to the character of individual rules and, hence, cannot account for inter-state 
variation. Therefore, we focus on state capacity within this paper.  
 
The concept of state capacity is not used uniformly in the literature and its operationali-
zation differs significantly. Resource-centered approaches define capacity as a state’s ability to 
act, i.e., the sum of its legal authority and financial, military and human resources.30 Neo-
institutionalist approaches, by contrast, argue that the domestic institutional structure influences 
the degree of a state’s capacity to act and its autonomy to make decisions.31 Thereby, domestic 
veto players come to the fore, which block the implementation of international rules because of 
the costs they have to (co-)bear.32 A high number of veto players reduces the capacity of a state 
to make the necessary changes to the status quo for the implementation of costly rules.33 In order 
to do justice to both lines of argumentation, we differentiate between the government autonomy 
and the government capacity of states. While government autonomy refers to institutional and 
partisan veto players (and is higher, the lower the number of veto players is), government capa-
city is geared to the financial endowment of states and their human resources. Yet, even if a state 
has sufficient resources, its administration may still have difficulties in pooling and coordinating, 
particularly if the required resources are dispersed among various public agencies (e.g. minis-
tries) and levels of government.34 We therefore distinguish between resource endowment and 
the efficiency of a state bureaucracy to mobilize and channel resources into the compliance pro-
cess. Italy and France are two prominent examples of how the two types of government capacity 
may diverge. Both countries command more resources than most of the other member states. 
Yet, their bureaucracies are comparably inefficient and face serious problems of corruption. 
 
In the implementation of European norms, both government autonomy and government 
capacity are necessary for the production as well as adaptation of preexisting national legal acts 
and their correct application. Based on these considerations we derive the following hypothesis 
from the managerial approach: The lower government autonomy and the lower government capacity, 
the more difficult it becomes for a member state to comply with European legal norms. Hence, higher 
rates of infringements can be expected for states with low government autonomy and capacity.  
 
                                                 
29Chayes and Chayes 1993, 1995; Chayes, Chayes, and Mitchell 1998; Young 1992; Haas, Keohane, and 
Levy 1993; Jacobsen and Weiss Brown 1995; Haas 1998. 
30Przeworski 1990; Haas 1998; Simmons 1998. 
31Katzenstein 1978; Evans 1995; Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985. 
32Putnam 1988; Duina 1997; Haverland 2000. 
33Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Tsebelis 2002. 
34Mbaye 2001; Larrue and Chabason 1998; Egeberg 1999.   9 
Table 2: Overview of the Management Hypotheses 
 
Government autonomy (H2a)  Government capacity (H2b) 
States with a low level of government auton-
omy infringe on European law more often than 
more autonomous states (since veto players 
might block or delay decisions). 
States with a low level of government capacity 
infringe on European law more often than 
states with a high level of capacity (since they 
do not have the material resources and/or effi-
cient bureaucracies to comply). 
 
Operationalization of the Independent Variables 
 
To test for the influence of government capacity on the distribution of non-compliance, 
we include two indicators that are prominent in the literature. First of all, we incorporate the 
GDP per capita (“GDPpc”).35 It is a general measure for the resources on which a state can draw to 
insure compliance. The data come from the Word Development Indicators.36 Whether a state has 
the capacity to mobilize these resources will be captured by the second variable, bureaucratic ef-
ficiency (“efficiency”). In the operationalization, we use an index of bureaucratic efficiency pro-
fessionalism of the public service created by Auer and her colleagues.37 The index consists of 
three components of bureaucratic efficiency: performance-related pay for civil servants, lack of 
permanent tenure and public advertising of open positions. Bureaucratic efficiency highly corre-
lates with measures of corruption, e.g. the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency Inter-
national.38  For issues with multicollinearity, we include only bureaucratic efficiency in our 
analyses. Other potential indicators of government capacity – such as the World Bank govern-
ance indicators by Kaufmann et al. (2002) – are not used either due to the fact that they cover 
only part of the time period analyzed in this paper or lack sufficient variance for comparative 
studies of OECD countries. 
 
Government autonomy is a function of the number of veto players in the political system 
of a member state.39 However, even if the number of the institutional and partisan veto players 
remains constant over time, the interests of these actors – for example regarding (non-)compli-
ance – may change. Therefore, we use an alternative veto player index (“polcon”), which allows 
for the interests of veto players in such a way that interdependences between veto players and 
the respective political system are taken into consideration.40  It is based on a simple spatial 
model of political interaction among government branches, measuring the number of indepen-
dent branches with veto power and the distribution of political preferences across these 
branches. They can be interpreted as a measure of institutional constraints that either preclude 
arbitrary changes of existing policies or produce gridlock and so undermine the ability of the 
government to change policies when such change is needed. Two alternative indicators of gov-
ernment autonomy are discussed in the literature: the executive control of the parliamentary 
agenda measured by the extent to which the government can successfully initiate drafts and rely 
on stable majorities for in the legislative branch,41 and the parliamentary oversight of govern-
                                                 
35Cf. Brautigam 1996. 
36World Bank 2005. 
37Mbaye 2001; Auer, Demmke, and Polet 1996. 
38Herzfeld and Weiss 2003. 
39Tsebelis 2002; Immergut 1998. 
40Henisz 2002. Beck et al. 2001 have developed a similar index. 
41Döring 1995; Tsebelis 2002.   10 
ment measured by the material (e.g., number of Committees) and ideational resources (e.g., 
information-processing capacity) relevant for the oversight of the legislative on the govern-
ment.42We had initially included both these variables but dropped them because of multicol-
linearity concerns, their lack of significant (executive control) and robustness (parliamentary 
oversight). 
 
3.3.   Legitimacy 
 
Constructivists draw on the social logic of appropriateness to explain compliance. States 
are socialized into the norms and rules of international institutions through processes of social 
learning and persuasion. They comply out of a normative belief that a rule or institution ought 
to be obeyed rather than because it suits their instrumental self-interests. This sense of moral ob-
ligation is a function of the legitimacy of the rules themselves or their sources.43 There are sev-
eral ways by which legitimacy can be generated. First, the rule is embedded in an underlying in-
stitution or a legal system, which is generally characterized by a high level of legitimacy (accep-
tance of the rule-setting institution).44 Second, a critical number of states already complies with 
an international rule. As a result, other states are “pulled” into compliance because they want to 
demonstrate that they conform to the group of states, to which they want to belong and whose 
esteem they care about (peer pressure).45 Third, legitimacy can also result from certain proce-
dures that include those actors in the rule-making that are potentially affected and who engage 
in processes of persuasion and mutual learning (procedural legitimacy).46 Both procedural legiti-
macy and peer pressure focus more on compliance with individual rules (exactly those which 
result from “fair” decision-making processes or those with which other states already comply). 
The acceptance of the rule-setting institution hypothesis emphasizes that voluntary compliance 
is generated by diffuse support for and general acceptance of the rule-setting institutions and 
the constitutive principles of the law-making and standing. Since our unit of analysis are coun-
try years and we study infringements rather than individually violated legal acts, we focus in 
this paper on the acceptance of and support for the rule-setting institution. 
 
The institutional legitimacy hypothesis can itself be disentangled into two different vari-
ants which stress different institutional aspects: the rule of law and the rule-setting institution.  
 
Domestic Culture of Law-Abidingness and Support for the Rule of Law  
 
Legal sociological studies refer to the relation between national legal cultures and their 
inclinations for compliance with national norms.47 Legal cultures comprise three elements: (1) 
the characteristics of legal awareness, (2) general attitudes towards the supremacy of law and (3) 
general attitudes towards the judicial system and its values.48 In this perspective, the degree of 
compliance correlates with the extent to which rule addressees accept the legitimacy of the rule 
of law and consider compliance with legal norms as demanded by a domestic logic of appropri-
ateness. The acceptance of a rule and the subsequent inclination to comply with it result from 
                                                 
42Harfst and Schnapp 2003. 
43Hurd 1999; Franck 1990; Finnemore and Toope 2001; Checkel 2001. 
44Hurd 1999; Kohler-Koch 2000. 
45Franck 1990; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998. 
46Dworkin 1986; Hurrell 1995; Franck 1995. 
47Gibson and Caldeira 1996; Jacob et al. 1996. 
48Gibson and Caldeira 1996.   11 
the diffuse support for law-making as a legitimate means to ensuring political order in a com-
munity.49 Consequently, even costly rules will principally be complied with. While this argu-
ment was developed for compliance with domestic laws, it should also apply to international 
and European rules since they also constitute law. This is all the more true for the EU, where 
European law is the law of the land because of its supremacy and direct effect. The correspond-
ing hypothesis (H3a) states that the lower the public support for the principle of the rule of law in a 
member state, the more often European law is infringed on. 
 
Support for the EU as the Rule-setting Institution 
 
The explanation of rule-consistent behavior due to diffuse support can not only refer to 
the acceptance of the law as a means to the insurance of political order in a community. It can 
also refer to the institution responsible for rule-setting. Rules are not only complied with be-
cause laws ought to be obeyed, but because the rules are set by institutions, which enjoy a high 
degree of support.50 Therefore, the second legitimacy hypothesis (H3b) states that member states 
with a high public supports for the EU as a rule-setting institution infringe European Law less often than 
member states with a EU-skeptic population. 
 
Table 3: Overview of the Legitimacy Hypotheses 
 
Rule of law (H3a)  Support (H3b) 
States with lower levels of support for the prin-
ciple of the rule of law infringe on European 
law more often than states with higher levels 
(since they feel a lower sense of obligation to 
comply with law in general). 
States with lower public support for the EU as 
a rule-setting institution infringe on European 
law more often than states with higher public 
support (since they feel a lower sense of 
obligation to comply with European law). 
 
Operationalization of the Independent Variables 
 
In principle, the operationalization of the rule of law hypothesis is unproblematic. The 
extent of the support for the rule of law can be quantified on the basis of opinion poll data (“rule 
of law”). Yet, good data are rare. Alternatively, the rule of law or “law and order tradition,” as it 
is better known from the International Country Risk Guide, data provided by the World Bank 
do not cover the full time period of our analysis.51 Therefore, we use James L. Gibson and Greg-
ory A. Caldeira’s opinion poll survey data, even though they only provide data for EU 12 mem-
ber states.52 The data measure the extent of support for the rule of law on the basis of agreement 
with the following statements: “it is not necessary to obey a law which I consider unfair,” 
“sometimes it is better to ignore a law and to directly solve problems instead of awaiting legal 
solution,” as well as “if I do not agree with a rule, it is okay to violate it as long as I pay attention 
to not being discovered.”  
 
Data on public support for the EU are available from Eurobarometer surveys. The accep-
tance of European institutions can be quantified by the question which refers to the support of 
the membership of one’s own country in the European Union (“support”).  
                                                 
49Easton 1965; Habermas 1992. 
50Dworkin 1986; Hurrell 1995; Gibson and Caldeira 1995. 
51Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2003. 
52Gibson and Caldeira 1996.   12 
So far, we have treated the three compliance approaches as competing or at least alterna-
tive explanations for member-state compliance. The next section will discuss to what extent the 
three approaches can be combined. Why should power, capacity and legitimacy not have joint 
and conditionals effects on state compliance, i.e., reinforcing or undermining their individual in-
fluence? 
 
3.4.  Towards an Integrated Approach 
 
The compliance literature has been rather skeptical about combining different ap-
proaches because of their diverging assumptions regarding “how the international system 
works, the possibilities for governance with international law, and the policy tools that are avail-
able and should be used to handle implementation problems.”53 Yet empirical studies support 
explanations based on power and capacity, as well as legitimacy.54 Likewise, the European Un-
ion and many international organizations use a combination of management, enforcement and 
legitimacy mechanisms to induce member-state compliance.55 Combining explanatory factors of 
the different approaches makes not only empirical sense; their theoretical assumptions are not 
always that incompatible either.  
 
Power and Capacity 
 
Enforcement theories conceptualize compliance as a strategic choice by actors who weigh 
the costs of compliance against the benefits. The management school, by contrast, emphasizes 
the importance of capacity to make and act upon (rational) choices in the first place. If actors 
lack the necessary resources, they have no other choice but to defect. This offers a fruitful oppor-
tunity to combine management and enforcement approaches: the effect of power on compliance 
is conditional on capacity. In binary terms, power only matters if states have the general capac-
ity to comply. While countries with no capacity would be bad compliers irrespective of their 
power, high-capacity member states could still choose whether to comply if they had the power 
to resist or deter enforcement pressures by the Commission. H1a and H1c would then become 
conditional on sufficient capacity. Statistically, such a relation would suggest a significant inter-
action effect between power and capacity. 
 
The effects of power and capacity could interact, reinforcing or undermining each other. 
Member states with both the capacity to comply and the power to shape EU rules according to 
their preferences should be better compliers than countries that lack both or have only high ca-
pacities to cope with the costs of compliance or the power of assertiveness. Conversely, member 
states with the power to deter or resist the enforcement pressures (i.e., power of deterrence and 
recalcitrance) might be less inclined to do so if they have the capacity to comply. Likewise, coun-
tries which have neither capacity nor power might have to make greater efforts to mobilize ad-
ditional resources than their powerful counterparts, which can defy compliance pressures.  
 
                                                 
53Raustiala and Victor 1998: 681; cf. Raustiala and Slaughter 2002: 543. 
54Tallberg 2002; Mbaye 2001; Haas 1998; Mendrinou 1996; Steunenberg 2006; Mastenbroek 2003, 2005; 
Reinhardt 2001; Steinberg 2002; see also Zürn and Joerges 2005. 
55Tallberg 2002; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Keohane, Haas, and Levy 1993; Mitchell 1996; Zürn and 
Joerges 2005.   13 
Capacity and Legitimacy 
 
The conditioning effect of capacity can also apply to its relation with legitimacy and 
(non-)compliance. The difference between legitimacy and enforcement approaches is that state 
choices are less guided by an instrumental logic of cost-benefit calculations but by a normative 
logic of appropriateness. Actors who seek to do what is socially accepted need as much capacity 
as actors who are driven by the strategic maximization of their self-interests. As in the case of 
power, capacity would be a scope condition for H3a and H3b. 
 
Member states that have strong capacities and value the law and/or the EU as a law-
making institution should be better compliers than countries with similar capacities but less 
support for the rule of law and/or the EU. Likewise, countries with lower capacities and higher 
support should make a greater effort to comply than their counterparts with equally weak ca-
pacities but citizens who are less law-abiding and supportive of the EU. Beside this positive in-
teraction effect of capacity and legitimacy with respect to compliance, we can also conceive of a 
direct and negative relation between the independent variables capacity and legitimacy them-
selves, which might bring about a negative, albeit spurious, effect of EU support on compliance. 
The literature has found that support for the EU and the rule of law, respectively, is directly 
linked to a lack of state capacity. Citizens of states with weak capacities have low support for the 
rule of law since domestic legislation is only weakly enforced.56 Consequently, they turn to the 
EU as an institution that may be more effective in providing public goods. 57 As a result, those 
member states most supportive of the EU might be among the worst compliers since the EU may 
produce rules for the provision of public goods but the member state still lacks the capacity to 
effectively implement them on the grounds (cf. Graph 2). This somehow counterintuitive find-
ing is corroborated by IR scholars, who argue that states have an incentive to delegate authority 
to international institutions to achieve policy outcomes that cannot be realized at the domestic 
level due to powerful veto players or lacking resources.58  
 
Graph 2: Capacity, Legitimacy, and Compliance 
 
 
 
                                                 
56Putnam 1993; Levi 1998; Tyler 1998. 
57Sánchez-Cuenca 2000. 
58Simmons 2002; Simmons and Martin 1998: 747-748; Keohane 1984; Putnam 1988; Keohane and Nye 1977; 
Ruggie 1983. 
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Power and Legitimacy 
 
The combination of the enforcement and legitimacy approaches is more problematic 
since they are based on different theories of social action. Despite attempts to integrate rational-
ist and constructivist reasoning, synthetic explanations of (non-)compliance are still rare.59 They 
tend to focus on the scope conditions for the two different logics of social action. In a similar 
vein, we would argue that states that have power can do as they please (conditional on capac-
ity), but what pleases them may well be defined by a normative logic that makes compliance the 
socially expected and accepted behavior – if their population is supportive of the rule of law and 
the EU, respectively.  Moreover, powerful states whose citizens strongly support the rule of law 
and show little support for the EU, respectively, may be more inclined to use their power of 
assertiveness to shape EU rules according to the preferences of their constituencies. 
 
Table 4: Overview of the Integrated Hypotheses 
 
Power and Capacity  Capacity and Legitimacy  Power and Legitimacy 
H4a: 
With increasing capacity, the 
positive effect of the power of 
recalcitrance (H1a) and the 
negative effect of the power of 
deterrence (H1c) on the pro-
pensity of member states to 
infringe on European law are 
reduced.  
 
H4b: 
With increasing capacity, the 
negative effect of the power of 
assertiveness (H1b) on the 
propensity of member states 
to infringe on European law is 
reinforced. 
H4c: 
With increasing capacity, the 
negative effects of the support 
for the rule of law (H3a) and 
the EU (H3b), respectively, on 
the propensity of member 
states to infringe on European 
law is reinforced. 
 
 
 
H4d:  
Capacity affects both legiti-
macy and compliance – lower 
capacity of a member state 
leads to higher public support 
for the EU, but still results in a 
high frequency of infringe-
ments. 
H4e: 
With increasing support for 
the rule of law and the EU, 
respectively, the positive effect 
of the power of recalcitrance 
and the negative effect of the 
power of deterrence on the 
propensity of member states 
to infringe on European law 
are reduced.  
 
H4f: 
With increasing support for 
the rule of law and decreasing 
support for the EU, respective-
ly, the negative effect of the 
power of assertiveness (H1b) 
on the propensity of member 
states to infringe on European 
law is reinforced. 
 
4.   Empirical Results 
 
In this section we report the results of our quantitative tests of the effects of power, ca-
pacity, and legitimacy on non-compliance.60 We discuss the findings in turn, referring to the 
models 1-5 of Table 5, which estimate the influence of each of the three theoretical approaches si-
                                                 
59But see Checkel 2001; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999. 
60 The regression results were generated using the statistics software package Intercooled Stata 9.2. We 
tested for first- and higher order autocorrelation. None was found. Problems of heteroscedasticity were 
counteracted by the use robust standard errors with clustering on member states. As to unobserved het-
erogeneity, we decided against the use of fixed effects (cf. Plümper, Manow, and Tröger 2005).   15 
multaneously controlling for the influences of at least one other approach at a time. The models 
comprise the most promising variables of each theoretical account, which were discussed in the 
respective sections on the operationalization of the independent variables. While model one con-
sists of the basic model without interactions, models 2 to 4 respectively test the three different 
groups of integrated hypotheses (H4s) – power and capacity, capacity and legitimacy, and 
power and legitimacy. Model 5 brings these separate models together in one single integrated 
model, adding a three-way interaction term for power, capacity, and legitimacy. In all models, 
we add time dummies to control for period effects that go beyond growing number of legal acts, 
discussed in section 2.1 above. 
 
Table 5: Capacity, Power, Legitimacy, and Infringements 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Power:       
GDP -0.0000  -0.0000   -0.0002**  0.0001 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)   (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
0.0336** 0.0264**   0.0577***  0.0059  Shapley Shubik  
   Index  (0.0122) (0.0090)   (0.0138)  (0.0167) 
Capacity:       
GDPpc  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   -0.0000** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
Efficiency -0.2227**  -0.2469***  -0.3260**   -0.1886* 
  (0.0869) (0.0235) (0.1194)   (0.0957) 
Polcon 0.0176  -0.1187  -0.4109   0.1633 
  (0.2788) (0.3248) (0.3482)   (0.3867) 
Legitimacy:       
Rule of law  -0.0020   0.0104  -0.0196***  -0.0030 
 (0.0089)    (0.0109) (0.0042) (0.0091) 
Support 0.0011   -0.0016  0.0046  0.0022 
 (0.0023)    (0.0031) (0.0036) (0.0018) 
Interaction Effects:       
 -0.0107**    -0.0330**  SSI * Efficiency 
 (0.0043)    (0.0123) 
   -0.0043  0.0056  Rule of law *  
   Efficiency     (0.0062)  (0.0092) 
    -0.0008  0.0022*  SSI * Rule of law 
    (0.0006)  (0.0012) 
     0.0001  SSI * Efficiency *  
   Rule of law       (0.0011) 
       
Constant  0.1091 0.1167 0.1543 0.1891* 0.0988 
  (0.0961) (0.0908) (0.1024) (0.0959) (0.1071) 
Year  dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations  233 233 233 233 233 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.48 0.50 0.39 0.43 0.52 
   16 
Dependent variable is reasoned opinions per legal act. OLS regressions with two-tailed t-tests. Robust 
(Hubert/White) standard errors (with clustering on member states) in parentheses. *** = p 0.01, ** = p < 
0.05, * = p < 0.1. 
 
4.1.   Enforcement 
 
The results give support to the recalcitrance hypothesis (H1a). The political weight in the 
Council of Ministers (“SSI”) has a significant effect on infringements per legal act. Member states 
like France, Italy or Germany have more Council votes and violate European law more frequent-
ly than member states with low voting power, such as Denmark, Finland, Sweden or the Nether-
lands (cf. Table 5, models 1, 2, and 4). Greater economic power, by contrast, does not substan-
tially affect a country’s compliance record. The size of the economy does not matter when it 
comes to infringements on European law. Note, however, that the recalcitrance hypothesis has 
difficulties in accounting for the compliance performance of the United Kingdom, on the one 
hand, and Greece, Belgium and Portugal, on the other. While the former complies much better 
compared with other ‘big countries’, such as France and Italy, the latter three have considerably 
less voting power and still belong to the worst compliers.  
 
One starting point for the explanation of these “outliers” is a closer inspection of model 2. 
The negative and significant interaction effect of voting power and bureaucratic efficiency indi-
cates what can also be read of graphs 3 and 4. With increases in capacity, the non-compliance 
promoting effects of power become less pronounced. This finding strongly supports the inte-
grated hypothesis H4a.  
 
Graph 3: Power and Capacity 
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Graph 4: Power and Capacity 
 
-
.
0
2
0
.
0
2
.
0
4
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
f
 
S
h
a
p
l
e
y
 
S
h
u
b
i
k
 
I
n
d
e
x
0 1 2 3
Bureaucratic efficiency
Upper bound of 95% confidence interval
Lower bound of 95% confidence interval
 
 
The assertiveness hypothesis (H1b) states that more powerful states infringe European 
law less often than weaker states, since they have been able to decrease the costs of compliance 
by shaping the law according to their preferences. It is tested in exactly the same way as the re-
calcitrance hypothesis (H1a) above using the same indicators. The only difference is our expecta-
tion with respect to the signs of our independent power variables. As the results have already 
give support to the recalcitrance hypothesis, the assertiveness hypothesis has to be rejected. 
 
The deterrence hypothesis (H1c) predicts the same outcome as the assertiveness hypo-
thesis (H1b), but draws on another causal mechanism, namely the likelihood that enforcement 
authorities shy away from enforcing compliance. Accordingly, the deterrence hypothesis would 
expect that powerful member states have fewer infringements than weaker ones since the Euro-
pean Commission and the ECJ are deterred to a greater extent. We operationalize the deterrence 
hypothesis in the same way as the recalcitrance hypothesis and use the same indicators. As the 
results have already given support to the recalcitrance hypothesis, the deterrence hypothesis has 
to be rejected, just as the assertiveness hypothesis above. This is not to suggest that the Commis-
sion might not act strategically. However, our expert survey clearly indicates that if the Com-
mission strategically enforced European Law, such behavior would not systematically disadvan-
tage particular member states (see section 2.1.).61 
 
Comparatively, the integrated hypothesis of power and legitimacy (H4e) scores just as 
bad as the assertiveness and the deterrence hypotheses. The interaction effect between the Shap-
                                                 
61To properly test the deterrence hypothesis, we would need the population of infringement cases and 
compare it to those infringements denounced by the Commission. However, we only have Commission 
data. Therefore, we cannot statistically test whether the Commission is systematically biased towards par-
ticular member states.   18 
ley Shubik Index and support for the rule of law is negative as hypothesized, but not signifi-
cantly different from zero. In other words, the effect of power on non-compliance is not condi-
tional on the presence or absence of legitimacy (cf. also Graphs 5 and 6).   
 
Graph 5: Power and Legitimacy 
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Graph 6: Power and Legitimacy 
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4.2. Management 
 
Testing the effect of government autonomy and government capacity on non-
compliance, we find a strong relation between the government capacity of a member state and 
its number of infringements (cf. Table 5, models 1-3 and 5). While general capacity measured by 
GDP per capita has no significant effect on compliance, we can see that larger bureaucratic effi-
ciency brings about fewer violations of European law. The coefficient for the efficiency of civil 
servants is negative and significantly different from zero. This is in line with other studies, 
which also find that the command of resources appear to be less an issue in the EU.62 Compli-
ance appears to depend much more on the capacity of mobilizing existing resources. This ex-
plains why France and Italy, which belong among the wealthiest member states of the EU, are as 
bad compliers as poor countries like Greece and Portugal. 
 
Government autonomy, by contrast, seems to have no effect on the number of infringe-
ments. The “polcon” coefficients are not significant in any model. In fact, they even change their 
algebraic sign depending on the model specification. If anything, our previous studies have re-
vealed that countries with several veto players commit fewer violations of European law than 
countries with a small number of veto players. The literature on consensual democracies could 
offer an explanation for this counterintuitive finding. As Arendt Lijphart has argued, high hori-
zontal and vertical dispersion of policy competencies fosters the inclusion of diverse societal in-
terests into political processes and outcomes.63 It forces political actors to construct broad com-
promises and comply with them, even in cases in which their own interests are not fully in-
cluded. In order to avoid deadlocks, consensual democracies develop political cultures with in-
clinations towards diffuse reciprocity. Yet, the group of compliance laggards, which includes 
unitary member states, such as Greece and France, as well as regionalized Italy and federal Bel-
gium, indicates that government autonomy is a poor predictor for compliance.  
 
In a nutshell, the government autonomy hypothesis (H2a) has to be rejected, while gov-
ernment capacity defined as bureaucratic efficiency (H2b) has a strong positive effect on the 
number of infringements of European law.  
 
4.3.   Legitimacy 
 
The statistical analysis finds hardly any significant correlation between the support for 
the rule of law and the frequency of violations of European law (H3a). Only model 4 indicates 
that infringements of EU law are rarer in countries in which the principle of the rule of law is 
supported. This is not enough evidence to state that the rule of law hypothesis is confirmed. 
However, we need to keep in mind the data issues discussed above. We would need much bet-
ter data for a more reliable statement about the influence of legal culture on the degree of com-
pliance. 
 
As to the question of the support for the EU, we find mixed and contra-intuitive results, 
which are in line with the statistical difficulties that follow from the integrated hypothesis H4d. 
Due to the close relationship between the right-hand side capacity and legitimacy variables, our 
models suffer from multicollinearity, thereby increasing standard errors and negating any sig-
nificant and meaningful findings with respect to EU support and non-compliance. If anything, 
                                                 
62Mbaye 2001; Hille and Knill 2006; Steunenberg 2006. 
63Lijphart 1999.   20 
we would rather find a positive correlation between public support for the EU and infringe-
ments of European law than the negative effect we would anticipate in line with hypothesis 3b. 
Those countries, in which the population is particularly supportive of European integration, 
rather infringe more frequently on legal acts than EU-skeptic countries like Denmark, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom, which comply particularly well with European law.  
 
In sum, the rule of law hypothesis (H3a) could probably be confirmed with better data. 
The support hypothesis (H3b), on the contrary, has to be rejected, since the results do not sup-
port the expected negative effect of EU support on non-compliance. However, these findings are 
less surprising if we evaluate them in light of our integrated capacity and legitimacy hypothesis 
(H4d), which may also explain why our data do not support the first model combining capacity 
and legitimacy (H4c). Neither do we find a negative effect of the support for the rule of law on 
the propensity of member states to infringe on European law in model 3, nor is it reinforced (cf. 
Graphs 6 and 7). 
 
Graph 7: Legitimacy and Capacity 
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Graph 8: Legitimacy and Capacity 
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5.   Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we analyzed why some member states violate European legal acts more 
frequently than others. In a first step, we developed hypotheses based on three prominent theo-
retical approaches. The management school of thought argues that non-compliance is not a stra-
tegic choice but occurs when states lack the necessary government capacity and government 
autonomy to implement international rules properly and in a timely manner. The enforcement 
approach provides three hypotheses on the importance of power for the distribution of non-
compliance (recalcitrance, assertiveness and deterrence). Researchers devoted to the study of le-
gitimacy and non-compliance argue that neither power nor lack of capacity determines non-
compliance, but that acceptance of rules as standards for appropriate behavior is the relevant in-
dependent variable. While there are many ways in which legitimacy might affect (non-) 
compliance with rules, we focused in this paper on testing the extent to which the support for 
the principle of the rule of law as well as the acceptance of the rule-setting institution explain the 
level of (non-) compliance in the member states. Instead of merely treating the three approaches 
as alternative or even competing explanations, we discussed different possibilities in which their 
explanatory factors could be combined in a theoretically consistent and meaningful way. 
 
In a second step, we extensively tested the empirical implications of all hypotheses, de-
rived from these three theoretical approaches and their combinations, with panel-econometrical 
methods. Our regression results show that capacity-centered, power-centered and legitimacy-
based models explain some of the variance of annual infringements per European legal act in 
force (cf. Table 5). Combining the variables from all three approaches we explain more than 50 
percent of the observed variance on the dependent variable. Even though one should not over-  22 
state the informative value of the adjusted R-squared statistic, it still highlights the substantial 
explanatory power of our model. 
 
Especially the combination of the power of recalcitrance (H1a) and bureaucratic effi-
ciency (H2b), as depicted in Graph 9, yields promising results (cf. H4a). Our quantitative analy-
ses reveal that powerful states, like France and Italy, which have a great share of votes in the 
Council, are less sensitive to enforcement costs and, therefore, have a higher share of infringe-
ments than weaker member states. Countries with high capacities, such as Denmark, Finland or 
the United Kingdom, have a better compliance record than states with lower capacities, such as 
Greece, Portugal or Belgium. Yet, important outliers remain. Great Britain is as powerful as 
France and Italy, but complies much better. Conversely, Greece is one of the least powerful 
countries in the EU, but is almost as bad a complier as powerful France and Italy. This can be ex-
plained by combining and interacting the managerial variable government capacity and the 
power of recalcitrance variable (“SSI”). States with high capacities and low political power in-
fringe on European law less frequently than other member states. In other words, the combina-
tion of low government capacity and great political power brings together inability to comply 
and the necessary political weight to be recalcitrant in the face of looming sanctions. Hence, we 
expect and find states such as Italy or France, which have a great share of votes in the Council, 
but are characterized by low government capacity, to have a comparatively high number of in-
fringement proceedings opened.  
 
Graph 9: Power, Capacity, and Compliance 
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These findings indicate some pathways for future research. First of all, our findings point 
to the importance of disentangling specific variants of each approach. Within the enforcement 
approach, both the assertiveness and the deterrence variant had to be rejected, while the recalci-
trance approach turned out to have explanatory power for the occurrence of non-compliance. 
The same holds true for the management approach, in which only the capacity of a government   23 
seems to be causally related to the number of infringements between member states. With re-
gard to the legitimacy approach, only the support for the rule of law variant has potential to ex-
plain member-states’ non-compliance with European law. However, all variants are also closely 
related to each other and not necessarily mutually exclusive. This is particularly the case for the 
power-centered approaches, in which both the recalcitrance and the deterrence hypotheses refer 
to the relationship between the deviant and the enforcement authority. Thus, we could argue 
that the confirmation of the recalcitrance hypothesis does not only reveal insights about why 
member states do not comply, but that it could also be interpreted as the inclination of the en-
forcement authority to open infringement proceedings against powerful member states. How-
ever, this argument only holds true if we use infringement proceedings as a proxy for non-
compliance. Further research has to focus on testing this argument by using different proxies.  
 
Second, our findings suggest going a step further and combine specific parts of different 
theoretical approaches to explaining non-compliance with law beyond the nation-state. While a 
combination of variables from the enforcement and the management approach turned out to 
have the greatest explanatory power, we still have to find alternative ways for explaining the 
(non-)effect of legitimacy. Are there other ways of theorizing and testing the relationship be-
tween support for EU institutions and compliance performance than by linking it to government 
capacity? In other words, does the legitimacy approach have explanatory power in its own 
right? This is particularly relevant question because we have tested only two variants of the legi-
timacy argument neglecting factors, such as procedural fairness or peer pressure. 
 
Finally, while the overall fit of our integrated model is quite good, a significant amount of 
variation still remains to be explained. Moreover, our integrated model has two “outlying” 
member states whose compliance records cannot be adequately accounted for by the combina-
tion of power- and capacity-centered models: Germany and Spain. While the latter performs 
better than predicted by the integrated model and has an overall medium level of infringements, 
the former has a worse compliance record than expected given its capacity. Part of the reason 
why a considerable share of non-compliance remains unexplained may be that the compliance 
literature in International Relations has largely neglected policy-related explanations as devel-
oped in the early implementation literature.64 “Bringing policy back in” could also be a fruitful 
way to account for variations within individual states and between policy fields or specific 
norms.  
 
So, what does the European Union teach us about non-compliance in international poli-
tics? The EU is often regarded as a system sui generis whose unique supranational properties 
(e.g., supremacy and direct effect of European law)65 preclude generalizations to other interna-
tional institutions. However, if we adopt a fine-grained perspective, ultimately, any political in-
stitution is one of a kind. To make fruitful comparisons, we need to climb up the ladder of ab-
straction.66 Hence, the potential for generalizations depends on the properties that are looked at. 
While the EU is the most legalized system in the world,67 its institutionalized compliance mecha-
nisms can also be found elsewhere.68 Our study has two important implications for compliance 
                                                 
64Pressmann and Wildawsky 1973; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981. 
65Alter 2001. 
66Sartori 1991. 
67Alter 2000: 490. 
68Mitchell 1996: 17-20; Smith 2000: 139-140; Peters 2003.   24 
with law beyond the nation state. First, states with both low capacities and high shares of power 
are compliance laggards and delimit the power of law beyond the nation state. They lack the ca-
pacity to easily comply with international law and, at the same time, are not willing to introduce 
major resource-redistributions and investments, but rather rely on their ability to resist enforce-
ment pressure.  
 
Second, the twinning of management and enforcement instruments is, indeed, an effec-
tive way to restore compliance.69 The combination of managerial dialogue, capacity building, 
and penalties addresses the two major sources of non-compliance identified by our study. How-
ever, two caveats are in order:  
 
(i) The managerial instrument of capacity-building is not sufficient in restoring compli-
ance, if it merely entails the transfer of resources to non-compliant states. Rather, it is essential to 
foster bureaucratic efficiency, e.g. by promoting anti-corruption measures as part of “good gov-
ernance.”  
(ii)  Even highly legalized institutions, such as the EU, the World Trade Organization, 
and the Andean Community, where monitoring and sanctioning powers are delegated to third 
parties,70 do not completely mitigate power differences between states.  
 
                                                 
69Tallberg 2002: 632. 
70Smith 2000.   25 
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